Kursk's Homeport
To understand the dimensions and ramifications of the disaster of the Russian
submarine Kursk, it helps to know something about its homeport region. The Kola
Peninsula, that stencils the southern coastline of the Barents Sea, is a frigid and
forbidding region, inherently melancholy, with an unequivocal air of detachment
about it. Geographically well fortified, it is flush with submarine bases, ports,
bunkers, command posts, shipyards and, at last count, 100 derelict, decommissioned
nuclear submarines. 50,000 nuclear fuel clusters from former nuclear reactors are
stored under inferior, supposedly temporary conditions. The land is rich in natural
resources like timber, minerals and fish, but lean in permutation. Once contributions
of the Soviet State, derelict cowsheds, broken-down trucks and tractors litter the
interior, all now relics of so many ruined collective farms. Towns wither along with
their populations. Life moves at a glacial rate in this frigid climate, where the
people have long learned to rely on themselves, while they wait for better days
and the grave.
The Sea Monster
The Kursk, commissioned in 1995, sank on August 12th with 118 people aboard in 354
feet of water in the Barents Sea. It was an Oscar II type nuclear-powered cruise
missile submarine (SSGN). Oscar II class submarines are mammoth, one of the world's
biggest submarines, 505 ft. long and displacing 19,000 tons. Its double, skillfully
insolated hull construction makes it nearly indestructible, it would take more than
a single heavy torpedo ever to sink one. If that behemoth had collided with a NATO
submarine, as Defense Minister, Marshal Igor Sergevev insinuated, the Kursk would
have unquestionably prevailed over a smaller allied adversary. Its outer hull
contains missiles, torpedoes and other stores, and with a total of 5 separate
pressure vessels within the outer pressure hull, the sub would absorb a lot of
energy before the inner hull ever fractured.
She was the star of the largest naval exercise the Russian Northern Fleet has staged
in a decade, being observed by two U.S. Los Angeles class attack submarines some
50 miles from the scene, along with several other allied monitoring vessels. She was
conducting exercises in mock sinking of American submarines and aircraft carriers. She
had loaded at her homeport of Murmansk, 28 torpedoes and 24 cruise missiles, known to
NATO as SS-N-19 Shipwreck. These missiles can carry a conventional 1,600 pound warhead
or nuclear warhead that can pack a punch equal to half a million tons of TNT. That
fateful morning, she was observed testing one of these missiles, with the 1,600 pound
conventional warhead, scoring a direct hit on a target 200 miles away.
The Sinking
At precisely 07:28:27 GMT, US navy hydro-acoustics picked up the first blast, then
at least a twice as powerful second explosion at 07:30.42. Based on examination of
the sonar data, the second one was actually several, nearly simultaneous detonations
and was equal to 5 tons of TNT. It nearly deafened the sonar operators, and shock
waves were registered at seismic stations 2,000 miles away. The controversy today is
what caused these detonations and what it could all mean in terms of strategic defense
for both the West and for Russia.
Suspect Torpedoes
Speculation turns around a torpedo accident, one reason being the sub was at periscope
depth when the calamity began, which is the level at which a submarine usually fires
its torpedoes. Reports also state that weapon-firing exercises were in progress and
Moscow sources corroborate that the Kursk was testing a new weapon system and that
might well have been the cause of the accident. Former vice president and now
governor of the region, Alexander Rutskoi, confirmed it when he said two high-ranking
military officers had told him that civilian military experts were aboard the Kursk
to test new torpedoes. They could have been testing either of two types of weapons,
an upgrade of the Squall or the newer Stallion.
The latter is a new highly secret weapon known as the 100-RU Veder missile, NATO
code-named: SS-N-16A Stallion. It utilizes silver battery driven propellers to send
it out from the submarine to a safe distance before a liquid fueled rocket engine
kicks in to send the missile to the surface. From there it flies under rocket power
at supersonic speed until just above its target, where it ejects a lightweight-torpedo
with a parachute and a 200 pound explosive warhead, that slowly drops into the water,
which then homes in on the submarine. It can be armed with a mini-nuclear warhead
and can engage targets at depths of up to 500 meters.
The Shkval (Squall) is an amazingly fast torpedo-type weapon, developed by the
hydro-aerospace systems department of the Moscow Sergo Ordzhonikidze Aviation
Institute. Most torpedoes go about 35-45 kt; the fastest allied one being the UK's
Spearfish, which has a maximum speed of 75 kt. The Squall can go 200 kt and it is
rumored that newer models can reach an astonishing speed of 260 kt!. It was back
in 1994, that Russian reports first surfaced regarding an anti-submarine missile
called Shkval, a rocket propelled, supercavitation weapon, 533 mm in diameter and
8.23m long, that could attack targets at a depth of 400 m and at ranges of up to
12 km.
Supercavitation Chapter And Verse
To understand supercavitation, one needs to understand the principles of cavitation.
Cavitation is the formation of a partial vacuum in a liquid as a result of the passage
through it of a swiftly moving object. It reduces the water pressure along its
surface, forming bubbles of various sizes, depending on the size and shape of the
object. Supercavitation occurs when, instead of bubbles, a cavity is created by the
low-pressure region, which reduces hydrodynamic drag. Which means with a submerged
object completely contained in such a gaseous envelope, the resulting reduction in
drag translates into very high speeds. The shape of the nose of the weapon, the
velocity and the static water pressure determine the shape of the gas cavity. One
of the most efficient methods to create this envelope is by deflecting the exhaust
forward and out of the nose section of the weapon. Since there is no direct contact
between the projectile and the water, incredible velocity can be attained.
No Warhead Requirement
The drawbacks are that only straight-line trajectory is feasible, (as any course
change would collapse the envelope), as well as the substantial sound factor. The
target easily detects the considerable noise the weapon creates; only its speed
compensates for its lack of stealth. Nowadays, in submarine warfare, mutual
detection is nearly simultaneous and usually at relatively short distances. The
subs circle each other like aircraft trying to get into a position to shoot a
torpedo. The target ship takes evasive action when it hears the conventional torpedo
heading its way. But with this supercavitation missile, it does not have time to
take evasive action. The kinetic energy of the missile on impact can negate the
warhead requirement. There are no known countermeasures, putting western navies
at a severe disadvantage. And to add additional menace, the Shkval can carry a
tactical nuclear warhead incorporating a timer to destroy an enemy sub, torpedo,
large surface ship, or even a land target.
Suspected Evidence
Russian submarine specialist, Vladimir Gundarov wrote in the Russian military's
newspaper, The Kursk was retrofitted 2 years ago, at the Sevmash shipyard in
Severodvinsk, with a potentially dangerous torpedo-launching technology against
the wishes of many high-ranking navy officials. The expensive silver battery and
propeller system was replaced by a new but risky technology using a gas stream to
propel the torpedo out of its tube. When the weapon is triggered, liquid fuel is
ignited, producing a gas that shoots the torpedo out of the tube. At the same time
they replaced the torpedo fuel with modern (UGST) duel purpose, liquid monopropellant
which has a nitrate ester energetic ingredient that can be very unstable and have a
low flash point and impact resistance unless chemical stabilizers are used to
prevent the problem. The new torpedoes are difficult to store and dangerous to handle,
the plus side was they are cheaper to make.
The Pope Connection
An American businessman and retired Naval Intelligence officer, Edmund Dean Pope,
was arrested on April 3rd on charges of espionage and held since in Moscow's grim
Lefortovo prison. He faces up to 20 years in prison if convicted. He was arrested
by the Federal Security Service (FSB) while allegedly attempting to buy technical,
classified documentation relating to ballistic missiles and torpedoes in the arsenal
of Russia's submarine fleet, from Professor Anatoliy Babkin, a department head of
rocket engineering at the Bauman Moscow State Technical University. Babkin is
considered by the FSB to be an agent recruited by an American intelligence agency.
(He could also have been turned). On the same day, the FSB arrested Pope's
associate and head of Energy Science and Power Systems Division, State College,
Penn., USA., Professor Daniel H. Kiely. He had joined Pope in Moscow to offer
technical advice. The laboratory headed by Dr. Kiely designs and develops torpedoes
for the US Navy. 68 year old Dr. Kiely was interrogated as a witness then released
and allowed to return to the United States on "humanitarian grounds" and for the
sake of good bilateral relations. Pope remains to this day in prison.
Deep Mystery Probed
Examination of the physical and seismic evidence, the fact that the torpedo
section of the bow was blown open, leaving an enormous hole on her starboard side,
and the two explosions 2 min. 15 sec. apart, strongly suggests a torpedo accident
caused the sinking. The fact that the second blast was considerably more powerful
than the first one, implies that a torpedo failed to leave the tube, perhaps because
the liquid gas booster ignited prematurely, causing the first detonation. The second
twice as powerful blast occurred when the warhead blew up and consequently exploded
several other torpedoes, explaining the almost simultaneous multi-explosions. The
ship had no opportunity to save itself, the massive hole and blast damage certainly
crippled the whole structure, the sudden intense expansion in air pressure and
flooding left no chance for survivors. The stricken sub didn't pitch down; it just
fell to the seafloor 354 feet down like a rock.
Suspended Animation
Because of shortages of cash flow and essential supplies the status of the assets
of the Russian Northern Fleet is very unreliable and can hardly be seen as
commensurate to a superpower; and they know it. Their nuclear submarines appear to
be the favored operational priorities, no doubt because they consider them so
important to home defense. Russia's fleet of aging nuclear submarine has dwindled to
50, and even fewer are operational due to a lack of spare parts and bad maintenance.
With their defense budget for next year at $7.43 billion they will find it hard to
maintain that level of readiness. Moreover, the budget shortage makes them look for
quick fixes, for those "silver bullet" solutions, which in turn provoke inherent
pitfalls. Just as an injection of a tranquilizer calms the distraught briefly,
entails risks and does nothing to alleviate the cause of the suffering likewise;
a strategy of injecting inadequate funds into the Russian navy can increase the
likelihood of an accident, is only transiently beneficial and creates a paranoiac
syndrome resulting in such a reflex action as the Pope affair. They are very concerned
by their fragile hold on national security and every secret counts.
Without an efficient and modern industrial and maintenance base there is no cure in
sight. Maintenance is critical in peacetime operations as it is to sustaining one's
armed forces in time of war. Furthermore, the "Soviet reaction" during and after the
Kursk disaster does not harbor much hope for serious change in the future.
Paradoxically, The Kursk was scheduled to escort a Russian flotilla to the
Mediterranean later this year in a show of force intending to symbolize the
rebirth of Russia as a world power. The Kursk tragedy brings to mind the Marquis
de Custine's abrasive but penetrating observation: "The Russians have rotted before
they have ripened."
Author
Peter B. Martin was born in New York in 1942. He studied biology and fine
arts and worked for the American Museum of Natural History for several
years doing research in mammalogy. He moved
to France in 1968. He has an abiding interest in natural history and the
arts and professional experience in both security and intelligence.
